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NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
____________ 
 
No. 11-2730 
_____________ 
 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
 
v. 
 
CHARLENE APELIAN, 
                                        Appellant 
______________ 
 
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY 
(D.C. Crim. No. 10-cr-00318-001) 
District Judge:  Honorable Freda L. Wolfson 
____________ 
 
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
December 9, 2011 
____________ 
 
Before: HARDIMAN, BARRY, Circuit Judges and RUFE,*
Appellant Charlene Apelian appeals her judgment of sentence after pleading guilty 
 District Judge 
 
(Opinion Filed:  January 5, 2012) 
____________ 
 
OPINION 
____________ 
 
BARRY, Circuit Judge 
 
                                                 
*   Honorable Cynthia M. Rufe, United States District Judge for the Eastern District of 
Pennsylvania, sitting by designation.  
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to unlawful use of an access device.  We will affirm.    
I. 
  Between May 2005 and June 2007, Apelian used a bank account routing number 
belonging to Realogy Corporation to illegally divert money to her personal accounts. The 
vast majority of these payments were made to Apelian’s American Express credit card 
account, which she used to make purchases at a variety of retailers, restaurants, and 
service providers.  All told, Apelian obtained a total of $294,864.02 from her unlawful 
use of the routing number.  After her conduct was discovered, Apelian was charged in a 
one-count information with unlawful use of an access device in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 
1029(a)(2).  On May 11, 2010, she waived indictment and pleaded guilty to the 
information pursuant to a plea agreement.   
 On June 13, 2011, the District Court held a sentencing hearing.  The Court 
calculated a total offense level of 15 with a criminal history category of II, resulting in an 
advisory Guidelines range of 21 to 27 months.  Turning to the factors of 18 U.S.C. § 
3553(a), Apelian argued that a probationary sentence was sufficient to satisfy the 
purposes of sentencing, and that a term of imprisonment would be unduly punitive due to 
her financial situation and medical needs.  In particular, Apelian noted that she suffered 
from fibromyalgia, chronic fatigue and immune dysfunction syndrome, post-traumatic 
stress disorder, and certain other mood and anxiety disorders.  Apelian treated these 
disorders with a regimen of medications and herbal supplements, which she claimed took 
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her and her doctors years to develop.  She argued that imprisonment would disrupt her 
treatment regimen and that the Bureau of Prisons (BOP) could not provide all the 
medications and supplements that were part of her regimen.  Apelian also argued that her 
physical and mental health would likely deteriorate in the prison setting.  With respect to 
her finances, Apelian argued that a term of imprisonment would render her unable to 
prevent foreclosure proceedings on her home, and her Social Security disability benefits 
would be discontinued during her imprisonment.  After hearing argument, the District 
Court concluded that Apelian’s circumstances did not merit a probationary sentence, but 
that a downward variance to a sentence of 18 months’ imprisonment was appropriate.  
Apelian timely appealed.  
II. 
We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a), and review 
Apelian’s challenge to the substantive reasonableness of her sentence for abuse of 
discretion.  Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 46 (2007).  We have held that the 
“substantive reasonableness inquiry must be highly deferential” because “the sentencing 
judge, not the court of appeals, is in a superior position to find facts and judge their 
import under § 3553(a) in the individual case.”  United States v. Merced, 603 F.3d 203, 
214 (3d Cir. 2010) (internal quotation omitted).  As this Court has explained: 
For a sentence to be substantively reasonable, a district court must apply the 
§ 3553(a) factors reasonably to the circumstances of the case.  A sentence 
that falls within the recommended Guidelines range, while not 
presumptively reasonable, is less likely to be unreasonable than a sentence 
outside the range.  The pertinent inquiry is whether the final sentence, 
 4 
wherever it may lie within the permissible statutory range, was premised 
upon appropriate and judicious consideration of the relevant factors. 
 
United States v. Lessner, 498 F.3d 185, 204 (3d Cir. 2007) (internal citations and 
quotation marks omitted).  “The party challenging the sentence bears the ultimate burden 
of proving its unreasonableness . . . .”  Id.  Ultimately, the sentence must be affirmed 
“unless no reasonable sentencing court would have imposed the same sentence on that 
particular defendant for the reasons the district court provided.”  United States v. Tomko, 
562 F.3d 558, 568 (3d Cir. 2009). 
We conclude that the District Court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to vary 
downward to a probationary sentence.  After hearing rather extensive argument from the 
parties, the District Court gave careful and judicious consideration to Apelian’s 
arguments regarding her mental and physical health, her medication needs, and her 
financial situation.  With respect to Apelian’s physical health, the District Court agreed 
that her autoimmune disease was “of concern,” but noted that individuals with severe 
diseases are routinely treated in the BOP.  The District Court also observed that much of 
Apelian’s treatment regimen consisted of non-FDA-approved supplements, which it 
deemed less compelling than prescription medication treatment.  In any event, the District 
Court cited documentary evidence from the BOP to conclude that Apelian’s medication 
needs could be adequately addressed in the BOP system, either through the BOP 
formulary, the purchase of supplements at the prison commissaries, or by a non-formulary 
request from Apelian’s treating physician.  With respect to her financial situation, the 
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District Court found Apelian’s arguments undermined by the fact that, despite financial 
difficulties with her bills and mortgage, Apelian had recently purchased a new car and 
had otherwise made poor financial choices.   
The District Court clearly found that Apelian’s arguments were entitled to some 
weight, as it granted a variance three months below the bottom of the Guidelines range.  
Although Apelian believes that her arguments warranted an even greater variance, we 
have held that a district court’s “decision to accord less weight to mitigation factors than 
that urged by [the defendant] does not render the sentence unreasonable.”  United States 
v. Young, 634 F.3d 233, 243 (3d Cir. 2011).  The District Court properly considered other 
factors under § 3553(a), including the fact that Apelian’s criminal conduct was a two-year 
scheme involving the theft of almost $300,000 that was used to purchase things well 
beyond the mere necessities of life.  The District Court also considered, as it was entitled 
to do, the fact that Apelian had committed previous financial and fraudulent crimes, 
including passing bad checks and fraudulently using a neighbor’s checks and bank 
account information.  Despite these other fraudulent crimes, Apelian had never served a 
custodial sentence.  Quite simply, the District Court did not abuse its discretion in this 
case.  
III. 
For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the judgment of sentence.   
 
 
